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Many constitutional political economists argue that the length of time constitutions re-
main in effect distinguishes constitutional politics from legislative politics. The author
explores the role of constitutional durability in a repeated rent-seeking game. A general
interest (e.g., consumers) in the game can lobby for a constitutional prohibition that pre-
vents the rent-seeking contest from occurring. A durable constitution can reduce ex-
pected rent-seeking expenditures if constitutional politics occurs less frequently than
legislative politics, stable rights to receive rents do not exist, and the general interest has
a longer time horizon than rent seekers. Under these conditions, general interest lobby-
ing for a constitutional prohibition denies transfers to future rent seekers unable to par-
ticipate in politics today.
Keywords: Rent seeking; constitutional political economy; rent dissipation
1. INTRODUCTION
Analysis of the effects of government’s redefinition of property
rights, the theory of rent seeking, has been a major contribution of
public choice scholarship. Rent seeking generates two types of social
costs: distortion of economic activity by the transfer and the use of re-
sources in lobbying for or against the transfer. The political force of
concentrated benefits and dispersed costs leaves representative de-
mocracy vulnerable to the emergence of a “rent-seeking society” (Bu-
chanan, Tollison, and Tullock 1980; Olson 1982).
Constitutional political economy argues that only a change in the
rules of the political game can truly reform the rent-seeking society.
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Special interest groups take advantage of consumers’ and taxpayers’
greater collective action and rational ignorance problems to dominate
legislative politics. General interest victories in the legislature are
likely to be transitory and fleeting. Only constitutional-level limits on
the power of government to transfer wealth can avoid negative-sum
rent seeking (Buchanan 1987). Yet constitutional rules are themselves
the outcome of a political process, and rent-seeking interest groups
can employ their significant political ability in constitutional politics.
Constitutional economics requires a reason why general interests can
prevail over special interests in constitutional politics (Sutter 1995).
Constitutional political economists emphasize the durability of con-
stitutional rules (Brennan and Buchanan 1985, 29), which produce
two effects. First, citizens have difficulty anticipating specifically how
future decisions made under the rules will affect them. Decision mak-
ing behind the veil of uncertainty is more likely to produce consensus
on efficient rules of the game (Brennan and Buchanan 1985, 30-31).
Second, infrequent constitutional politics advantages broad, general
interests with high costs of organizing for political action (Boudreaux
and Pritchard 1993). General interests need only organize for consti-
tutional politics and rely then on the rules of the game to protect their
interests in day-to-day politics.1
Constitutional rules, however, may not be as durable as constitu-
tional political economists presume. Although the U.S. Constitution
has only been amended 27 times in more than 210 years, judicial re-
view of government acts occurs almost every day. Furthermore, the
timing of constitutional politics may be endogenous. Constitutional
politics may be infrequent only if the constitution already allows
wealth transfers. Rent seekers may continually strive to overturn a
constitutional prohibition on transfers should one ever pass. Anderson
et al. (1990) indeed found that interest groups direct their lobbying ef-
forts to constitutional or legislative action based on the degree of judi-
cial independence in a state. Tollison and Wagner (1991) argued that
lobbying by rent seekers to reverse reform will dissipate any potential
gains from reform and speculated that a cycle of deregulation and
reregulation could even lead to superdissipation of rents. Conse-
quently, the role for constitutional durability in reducing rent-seeking
costs is of more than idle interest.
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I explore this question using a two-period extension of a constitu-
tional prohibition rent-seeking model introduced in Sutter (2002).
Lobbying by rent seekers and consumers in the first stage determines
passage of a constitutional prohibition on transfers. If a prohibition
does not pass, the traditional rent-seeking contest (Tullock 1980) en-
sues to determine establishment of a transfer program. The two-period
extension examines the effect of the timing of the constitutional and
rent-seeking stages on expected lobbying expenditures. A constitu-
tion is durable in the model if the constitutional stage occurs only in
Period 1.
I find that constitutional durability is neither a necessary nor a suffi-
cient condition for reducing the social cost of rent seeking. Introduc-
tion of a constitutional stage in a rent-seeking model creates a collec-
tive action problem among transfer seekers and thus reduces total
expected lobbying (Sutter 2002). A durable constitutional prohibition
does not, by itself, produce any further reduction in expected lobby-
ing; on the other hand, frequent constitutional politics does not offset
the gains due to rent seekers’constitutional free-riding problem either.
A durable constitutional prohibition produces additional welfare
gains if the constitutional stage occurs only in Period 1, while a rent-
seeking contest occurs each period, and the Period 2 rent seekers are
not also Period 1 rent seekers.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 pres-
ents a two-stage rent-seeking model with a constitutional prohibition
on wealth transfers. Section 3 considers a two-period extension of the
model with varied timing of the constitutional and legislative stages
and demonstrates when rent-seeking costs are reduced compared to
the one-period game. Section 4 discusses the plausibility of the condi-
tions under which a reduction in costs of rent seeking occurs. The final
section discusses implications of this research for the design of consti-
tutions to control wealth transfers.
2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION GAME
I employ a two-stage constitutional prohibition game. Lobbying in
the first stage determines adoption of a constitutional prohibition pre-
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venting a wealth transfer. If the constitutional prohibition fails, the
standard rent-seeking game ensues to determine the existence and re-
cipient of the transfer. I ignore issues regarding the form or enforce-
ment of a prohibition to accomplish this goal. The role of the constitu-
tional contest is clear in the model: to prevent the rent-seeking
contest.2 The constitutional contest does not allocate the rent; it deter-
mines only if a rent-seeking contest occurs. So, n rent seekers vie for a
transfer exogenously set at R. All players are risk neutral. Transfer
payers, whom I call the general interest, make defensive expenditures.
The general interest bears the transfer plus the deadweight loss from
the transfer, D. I model the general interest as a single player to main-
tain tractability, with parameter Θ ∈ (0, 1] capturing the severity of the
general interest’s collective action problem. The general interest plays
the game for G = Θ • (R + D); a smaller value of Θ represents a more se-
vere collective action problem.3
Let x and yi be the rent-seeking stage expenditures by the general in-
terest and the ith transfer seeker. I assume that the full amount of all
lobbying expenditures at both the legislative and constitutional levels
comprises actual resource costs, although the results still hold as long
as the same fraction of all lobbying expenditures comprises social
costs. I use the widely employed ratio success function for both the
rent-seeking and constitutional stages of the game.4 The probability that
rent seeker i captures the transfer, πi, is yi /(Y + x) or 0 if Y + x = 0, where
Y = Σyi. The total probability of a transfer, π(y, x), equals Y/(Y + x). Let
w and zi be constitutional stage expenditures by the general interest
and the ith rent seeker. The probability of defeat for a prohibition on
transfers is σ(w, z) = Z/(Z + w) or 0 if Z + w = 0, where Z = Σzi.
I assume that all n rent seekers participate in both the constitutional
stage and subsequent rent-seeking contest.5 A strategy for each player
in the constitutional prohibition game is an expenditure pair, (w, x) or
(zi, yi). The general interest’s utility maximization problem in the two-
stage game is
{ }Maximize
w, x
w z y x G x wσ π( , ) ( , )• − • − − .
The typical rent seeker solves
{ }Maximize
z y
w z y y x R y z
i i
i i i i i
,
( , ) ( , , )σ π• • − −
−
.
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The Nash equilibrium of the constitutional prohibition game is a pair
of expenditures for each player. Let a c superscript denote the symmet-
ric equilibrium values for the game. The general interest makes no ex-
penditure in the rent-seeking stage if its stake is sufficiently small, that
is, xc = 0 if G < G* = (n – 1) • R/n. The general interest in this instance
finds resistance to transfers at the legislative stage futile. Equilibrium
in the game is as follows:
If G ≥ G* If G < G*
wc = n2 • G2 • R3 • S2/[V 2 • (R2 + n • G • S)2] n2 • G2 • R/(R2 + n • G2) (1)
xc = n • G • R • [n • G – (n – 1) • R]/V2 0 (2)
yc = n • G • R2/V 2 (n – 1) • R/n2 (3)
zc = G • R5 • S/[V 2 • (R2 + n • G • S)] G • R2/[n • (R + n2 • G)2] (4)
πc = n • R/V 1 (5)
σc = R2/[R2 + n • G • S] R/(R + n2 • G) (6)
where S = 2 • n • G – (n – 2) • R and V = R + n • G.
The equilibrium probability of transfers is πc • σc. Because σc < 1
even when the general interest finds legislative politics futile (G <
G*), the constitutional prohibition reduces the likelihood of wealth
transfers. The general interest is more likely to prevail in the constitu-
tional contest than in the legislative contest, σc < πc, for all values of G.
The general interest’s constitutional success stems from rent seekers’
collective action problem in constitutional politics—defeating a con-
stitutional prohibition is a public good for rent seekers.
Lobbying efforts comprise a large portion of the costs of rent seek-
ing. Expected lobbying in the constitutional prohibition game is as
follows:
Ec = n • G • R3 • [3 • n • G – (n – 3) • R]/[V 2 • (R2 + n • G • S)] if G ≥ G*,
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= R • [n • G + (n – 1) • R]/[n • (R + n2 • G)] if G < G*. (7)
The constitutional prohibition game adds constitutional lobbying but
avoids rent-seeking stage lobbying if a prohibition passes. Despite the
apparent ambiguity, Sutter (2002) demonstrated that the constitu-
tional prohibition lowers expected lobbying relative to the traditional
rent-seeking game. The general interest takes advantage of rent seek-
ers’ constitutional collective action problem to prevent the legislative
stage and reduce the cost of the rent-seeking society. I now examine
whether a durable constitution produces any further reduction in rent-
seeking costs in a two-period repeated game extension of this model.
3. EXTENSION TO A TWO-PERIOD MODEL
The crucial aspect of the two-period extension concerns the timing
of constitutional and legislative politics. Table 1 displays four possible
frequencies of the constitutional and rent-seeking stages in the two-
period model, given that both a constitutional stage and a rent-seeking
stage occur in Period 1.6 Cases A, B, and C involve a first-period con-
stitutional stage and hence address the issue of constitutional durabil-
ity, the focus of this article. The last case, D, with a constitutional stage
in each period but a rent-seeking stage only in Period 1, may not pro-
duce a well-defined game and is not examined here.7 Table 1 does not
present cases not involving a first-period constitutional contest. Al-
though of relevance for constitutional reform of existing rent seeking,
a prohibition adopted in Period 2 lasts a maximum of one period and
thus reveals nothing about the role of durability, so I restrict attention
to Cases A, B, and C.
Both the constitutional and rent-seeking stages occur each period in
Case A. Period i’s constitutional stage determines a prohibition on
transfers for that period; the succeeding rent-seeking stage allocates
only that period’s rent. In Case A, constitutional politics occurs as fre-
quently as legislative politics and provides a benchmark for compari-
son of a durable constitution. The case also considers whether over-
turning a prohibition can offset the gains from reform, as Tollison and
Wagner (1991) suggested. Case B allows constitutional and rent-
seeking stages only in Period 1. A prohibition adopted in Period 1 can-
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not be overturned in Period 2 and thus is durable. But the transfer is
noncontestable: The winner of the Period 1 rent-seeking contest re-
ceives the rent for both periods.8 Constitutional politics occurs as fre-
quently as legislative politics in Case B. Case C involves a constitu-
tional stage that occurs only in Period 1, whereas a rent-seeking stage
occurs each period (provided a prohibition does not pass). The trans-
fer in Case C is contestable; the successful Period 1 rent seeker faces a
challenge from other contenders in Period 2. The Period 1 winner
earns no property right to the rent. Often, rents are formally contest-
able but, in reality, very stable; incumbent firms typically have a sig-
nificant advantage in “contests” for the renewal of a cable television
franchise or television or radio licenses. Sufficient incumbent advan-
tage renders the transfer noncontestable, which is Case B. For simplic-
ity, Case C considers the limiting instance of no incumbent advantage.
Constitutional politics occurs more frequently than legislative politics
in Case C.
All participants are fully aware of the timing of each stage in each
case. Let δ be the discount factor and E 2 be expected lobbying in the
two-period model. I compare E 2 and (1 + δ) • E c: When E 2 = (1 + δ) •
Ec, the two-period extension has no effect on expected discounted lob-
bying; if E 2 >(<) (1 + δ) • Ec, the multiperiod model strengthens
(weakens) the effect of a constitutional prohibition.
Case A merely repeats the model of Section 3. Expected lobbying
in each period is Ec, and the present value of total lobbying is (1 + δ) •
Ec. The welfare gain from a prohibition due to the rent seekers’collec-
tive action problem does not depend on the frequency of constitutional
politics. A prohibition does not have to be durable to mitigate rent
seeking. The multiperiod setting by itself, however, produces no fur-
ther reduction in lobbying.
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TABLE 1: Timing of Stages in the Two-Period Model
Constitutional Stage Rent-Seeking Stage
Case Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
A Yes Yes Yes Yes
B Yes No Yes No
C Yes No Yes Yes
D Yes Yes Yes No
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Case B considers a durable prohibition and a noncontestable trans-
fer. Because the Period 1 rent-seeking stage allocates the rent for both
periods, the rent seekers play this stage for (1 + δ) • R, and the general
interest plays for –(1 + δ) • G. The equilibrium rent-seeking stage ex-
penditures are just (1 + δ) • x c and (1 + δ) • yc. The equilibrium consti-
tutional stage expenditures are then (1 + δ) • wc and (1 + δ) • zc, and the
present value of expected dissipation is (1 + δ) • Ec. Mathematically,
this result follows because the lobbying function is homogeneous of
degree zero and all players are risk neutral. In such a case, ratcheting
up the stakes for each side increases both sides’ expenditures propor-
tionally and has no effect on the probability outcome. A durable prohi-
bition by itself does not produce a further reduction in lobbying, and a
noncontestable rent renders the constitution’s durability irrelevant.
Each period’s rent-seeking stage contest is as in Section 3 for Case
C. The Period 1 rent-seeking stage does not allocate the rent (or a
transferable right to the rent) for Period 2. The constitutional stage in
this case depends on whether the same n rent seekers participate in
each period’s rent-seeking contests. The expected value to rent seeker
i of participation in a rent-seeking stage is π1
c cR y⋅ − , so a rent seeker
who part icipates in each period’s transfer contest has
( ) [ ]1+ ⋅ ⋅ −δ π ic cR y at stake in the constitutional stage. But if different
individuals pursue the Period 2 rent, the Period 1 rent seekers have
only π i
c cR y⋅ − at stake in the constitutional stage. The general inter-
est has a net stake of (1 + δ) • [–πc • R – x c] in Period 1’s constitutional
stage. When the same rent seekers contend for the transfer in each
stage, the game is equivalent to Case B, and the present value of ex-
pected lobbying is (1 + δ) • Ec. But with different rent seekers in Period
2, the equilibrium constitutional stage equilibrium is
( )
( )[ ]w
n G R S
V R n G S
2
2 2 2 3
2 2 2
1
1
=
+ • • • •
• + + • • •
δ
δ
, if G ≥ G*
= n2 • (1 + δ) • G2 • R/[R + (1 + δ) • n2 • G]2, if G < G* (8)
z
G R S
V R n G S
2
5
2 2 2
1
1
=
+ • • •
• + + • • •
( )
[ ( ) ]
δ
δ
, if G ≥ G*
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= (1 + δ) • G • R3/[R + (1 + δ) • n2 • G]2, if G < G* (9)
σ2 = R2/[R2 + (1 + δ) • n • G • S], if G ≥ G*
= R/[R + (1 + δ) • n2 • G]. if G < G* (10)
The present value of expected lobbying in this case is E 2 = n • z2 + w2 +
σ2 • (1 + δ) • Er, which equals in equilibrium
E n G R n G n R
V R n G S
2
3
2 2
1 3 3
1
=
+ • • • • • • − − •
• + + • • •
( ) [ ( ) ]
[ ( ) ]
δ
δ
, if G ≥ G*
=
+ • • • + − •
• + + • •
( ) [ ( ) ]
[ ( ) ]
1 1
1
2
2
δ
δ
n G R n R
n R n G
. if G < G* (11)
The ratio of stakes in the constitutional stage increases in the
general interest’s favor when first-period rent seekers cannot capture
(either directly or indirectly) second-period rents. This increases the
probability of passing a prohibition compared to the one-period game,
σ2 < σc, and reduces expected lobbying, as the following result
establishes.9
Proposition 1. Discounted expected lobbying is lower with a durable
constitution and contestable transfers when the second-period rent
seekers differ from the first-period rent seekers, E 2 < (1 + δ) • Ec.
Proof. I consider first G ≥ G*, then G < G*. In the former case, the dif-
ference (1 + δ) • Ec – E 2 is
( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) [ ( ) ] [1 3 3 1 2 23 2 2+ − − + + − − − −δ δnGR nG n R R nG nG n R R nG{ }
{ }
2 2
1 2 2 22 2 2
nG n R
R nG R nG nG n R R nG nG
− −
+ • + + − − +
( ) ]
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ] [δ { }− −( ) ]n R2 .(12)
This simplifies to
( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]
( ) (
1 3 3 2 2
1
3
2 2
+ − − − −
+ • + +
δ δnGR nG n R nG nG n R
R nG R{ }{ }δ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]nG nG n R R nG nG n R2 2 2 22− − + − − .
(13)
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Because G ≥ G*, the difference in (13) is positive.
When G < G*, the difference (1 + δ) • Ec – E 2 is
( )[ ( ) ][ ( ) ] ( )[ ( ) ](1 1 1 1 12 2 2+ + − + + − + + −δ δ δnGR n R R n G nGR n R R n G
n R n G R n G
+
+ + +
2
2 21
)
( )[ ( ) ]δ .
(14)
This simplifies to
( ) [ ( ) ]
( ) [ ( )
1 1
1
2
2 2
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅
δ δ
δ
n G R n R n G
n R n G R n ⋅G ]
,
(15)
which is clearly positive. QED.
The intuition behind this result is fairly simple; current rent seekers
do not receive the second-period transfer, whereas the second-period
rent seekers cannot participate in Period 1’s constitutional contest.
Second-period transfers increase the relative stakes of the constitu-
tional contest for the general interest, increasing the probability a pro-
hibition passes. Second-period rent seekers cannot respond to the gen-
eral interest’s lobbying, so total lobbying expenditures do not simply
increase in the constitutional contest, as in Case B.
Proposition 1 establishes only that expected lobbying falls in Case
C, not the magnitude of the reduction. Numerical simulations provide
some clue here. Set the size of the transfer at R = 10 and ignore the ef-
fects of discounting, δ = 1. Table 2 provides the value of expected lob-
bying in the two-period contest, E 2, and the ratio of this value to twice
the value of expected lobbying from the constitutional prohibition
game, E 2/(2 • Ec), for values of n ranging from 1 to 10 and values of G
from .01 (extreme collective action problems) to 10 (well-organized
consumers or an extremely inefficient transfer mechanism). The limit-
ing case of lobbying reduction intuitively is E 2/(2 • Ec) = .5, which
avoids all second-period lobbying costs. The case of n = 10 reaches
this ratio for sufficiently high values of G. Examination reveals that
the percentage reduction in lobbying costs increases as n increases for
a given G and as G increases for a given n. Note, however, that ex-
pected lobbying is already low when n = 10, so a larger absolute reduc-
tion in expected lobbying occurs for smaller values of n. The constitu-
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tional stage allows the general interest to exploit rent seekers’
collective action problem; removing the value of Period 2 rents
strengthens the general interest’s relative advantage.
4. DISCUSSION
My analysis has identified conditions under which a durable consti-
tution reduces the costs of rent seeking beyond the level resulting from
the rent seekers’ free rider problem in overturning a prohibition. The
constitution must be durable, the transfer must be contestable, and the
set of rent seekers must turn over between periods. I discuss in this sec-
tion the plausibility of these three conditions.
Durability in this model does not strictly mean the length of time
the constitution remains unaltered. Rather, durability refers to the in-
frequency of constitutional politics. Suppose a constitutional prohibi-
tion enacted in Period 1 is challenged but not overturned in Period 2.
Such a prohibition remains in effect for two periods, yet constitutional
politics is frequent, and this example does not qualify for Case C. The
relevant question becomes whether constitutional politics is truly in-
frequent, and this is more difficult to address than the length of time a
constitutional provision remains in place. Evidence based on the dura-
tion of rules does not address the frequency of efforts to change the
rules. Arguably, every court challenge of the constitutionality of a law
and each proposed constitutional amendment introduced in Congress
represent a constitutional stage game. Clearly, these can occur fre-
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TABLE 2: Potential Reduction in Expected Lobbying
n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 10
G E2 E2/2 • Ec E2 E2/2 • Ec E2 E2/2 • Ec E2 E2/2 • Ec
10 4.10 0.66 1.83 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.16 0.50
8 4.21 0.60 2.44 0.55 0.78 0.51 0.21 0.50
6 4.89 0.64 5.67 0.96 0.90 0.51 0.25 0.50
4 5.35 0.70 6.92 0.99 1.14 0.52 0.32 0.50
1 3.07 0.90 8.57 1.0 3.00 0.58 0.95 0.52
.1 0.39 0.98 9.81 1.0 10.8 0.83 6.07 0.61
.01 0.04 1.0 9.98 1.0 15.3 0.98 15.0 0.92
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quently. Several provisions restricting wealth transfers, such as the
contracts clause, the interstate commerce clause, and the Fifth
Amendment’s prohibition on takings, have remained in place for more
than 200 years, but their meaning has been changed by judicial inter-
pretation over the years (Siegan 1980). The force of precedent in con-
stitutional law serves to make judicial challenges less frequent; once
the Supreme Court has ruled on a question, little incentive exists to
mount a new challenge until the composition of the Court changes.
Transfers must be contestable to prevent capitalization of second-
period rents into the Period 1 contest (McCormick, Shughart, and
Tollison 1984); first-period rent seekers would then take this capital-
ized rent into account in constitutional lobbying. The contestability of
rents is an empirical matter. Crew and Rowley (1988) argued persua-
sively that rents are generally contestable. A current government can-
not prevent a future regime from transferring a rent from an incumbent
to a challenger. Time consistency is a serious problem in political
economy precisely because governments cannot generally commit
over time.
Finally, Period 1 rent seekers must not value second-period rents. A
contestable transfer is not sufficient for this. If the same set of rent
seekers contends each period, rent seekers consider the value of par-
ticipation in the second contest in constitutional lobbying. The set of
rent seekers must turn over between periods. Turnover depends on
barriers to entry into rent seeking; high barriers to entry produce little
turnover of rent seekers. Another factor is whether rights to participate
in rent seeking can be transferred. In this case, the identity of the actual
rent seekers might change, but a rent seeker could sell the participation
right at the end of one period, so the Period 2 rents still enter the consti-
tutional stage calculation. Turnover would occur if the number of po-
tential rent seekers exceeds n and a cost of participation limits any one
contest to n active participants. Any one potential rent seeker would be
unlikely to participate in both contests. A landed aristocracy whereby
nobles contend for favors from the royal court represents a case in
which turnover is unlikely. The court favorite may be determined pe-
riod by period, so royal prerogative ensures a contestable transfer. But
the nobles would recognize the value of participation in future con-
tests. Democracy approximates the conditions for turnover—all citi-
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zens possess participation rights, and the barriers to entry in rent seek-
ing are low.
A difference in discount factors might also prevent the second-
period transfer from entering into Period 1 rent seekers’ calculations.
The veil of uncertainty can produce this effect. Suppose the two peri-
ods in the model are distant in time, perhaps corresponding to succes-
sive generations. Citizens behind the veil do not know if they will be
on the paying or receiving end of transfers and hence have an incentive
to choose constitutional rules restricting government’s power to trans-
fer wealth (Brennan and Buchanan 1985). If the identity of second-
period rent seekers is unknown at the start of Period 1 and the transfer
is contestable, the second-period rent is eliminated from consider-
ation in the constitutional contest.10
5. DURABILITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
A long-lasting constitution by itself does not reduce the costs of
rent seeking, but durability can make a contribution. I conclude by
considering the implications of my analysis for the design of a consti-
tution to limit the costs of transfer seeking.
Constitutional politics must occur infrequently, and precedent in
constitutional law serves this end. A constitution could directly regu-
late judicial review, mandating a minimum waiting period for
rearguing a decision, and thus strengthen precedent in making consti-
tutional politics infrequent. Similar regulation of the amendment pro-
cess would impose a minimum waiting period for reconsideration of a
failed amendment or attempt to repeal an amendment. Finally, provi-
sions limiting government’s powers to transfer wealth could be made
unamendable, requiring future constitutional politics to involve over-
turning the constitution.
The constitution could also undermine the stability of rights to
rents. The U.S. Constitution prohibits the current Congress from bind-
ing a future Congress, thus limiting the ability of government to make
long-term contracts. Separation of powers and an independent judi-
ciary also undermine the stability of government deals. Constitutional
economists continue to debate the actual degree of judicial independ-
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ence.11 Even if the judiciary does not routinely overturn legislative
deals, the potential exists, introducing risk and reducing the expected
value of rents won today.12
The constitution should also keep barriers to entry for future rent-
seeking contests as low as possible—in particular, avoiding rights to
seek government favors. Elaborate procedures for bidding on govern-
ment contracts and reducing the number of contenders for rents have
an effect similar to rent-seeking rights. The value of future contracts
will be capitalized in a privileged bidder’s current stock price. Limits
on participation in contests or subsequent bidding after winning (term
limits on receiving rent) increase turnover of rent seekers. Note the
contrast with Tullock (1980) on the role of barriers to entry. A small
and stable number of contenders in the rent-seeking contest limit lob-
bying. Yet the prospect of competition from future contenders creates
an intertemporal public goods problem for rent seekers and increases
the probability of passing a prohibition on transfers today. Social wel-
fare rises if the welfare of future generations of rent seekers is ignored
in today’s constitutional contest.
NOTES
1. Ackerman (1991) similarly discussed U.S. constitutional history in terms of constitu-
tional “moments” in which “the people” (a general interest) altered the rules of the game in ac-
cordance with their evolving preferences.
2. I do not claim that all constitutional provisions are designed to counter rent seeking. Cer-
tainly, some provisions, such as the 16th Amendment allowing the income tax, have facilitated
rent seeking.
3. Public good rent-seeking models (Katz, Nitzan, and Rosenberg 1990; Nitzan 1991) ex-
plicitly model contributions to the general interest. My approach allows generality because I
need not assume a specific distribution of the transfer’s costs or rule out employment of a tech-
nology of cooperation.
4. Papers employing the ratio function include Tullock (1980), Hillman and Katz (1984),
Baron (1989), and Fabella (1995).
5. Alternatively, some rent seekers might not participate in the constitutional contest alto-
gether, but total lobbying expenditures remain unchanged as the number of active rent seekers
changes (Katz, Nitzan, and Rosenberg 1990; Sutter 2002).
6. Occurrence of the rent-seeking stage is always contingent on the outcome of the consti-
tutional stage.
7. Suppose a prohibition passes in Period 1, so the rent-seeking contest does not occur. If
the prohibition is overturned in Period 2, no rent-seeking game follows in this case.
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8. A noncontestable transfer creates a stable property right for Period 2’s transfer. The Pe-
riod 1 rent seeker can sell this right if he or she wishes, as with a taxicab medallion.
9. Welfare gains exceed the reduction in lobbying expenditures because of the reduced
probability of the inefficiency cost of transfers.
10. A sufficiently thick veil of uncertainty ensures that no one knows if he or she will be a
rent seeker during the constitutional stage.
11. Landes and Posner (1975) argued that the “independent” judiciary actually serves as an
agent of the legislature, upholding prior legislative deals against the current government. For a
dissenting view, see Boudreaux and Pritchard (1994).
12. The current model assumes that the winner of the rent-seeking contest merely receives a
transfer. If the transfer involves use of a durable asset (e.g., mining or logging rights on public
land), short-term rights discourage conservation of the resource to maximize its lifetime value.
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